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of reversionary rights in the sense that the lease would be ex-
tended beyond its primary term in the absence of production; or,
that the lease would be valid if the mineral rights returned to
the land within the primary term of the lease when the lessor
had previously sold the land.42 For these reasons, it is suggested
that, when the doctrine of after-acquired title perfects a lease of
mineral rights not owned at the time of execution but subse-
quently acquired, there is no violation of the policy considera-
tions adhered to by the Louisiana Supreme Court.43
Burrell J. Carter
Negotiable Instruments Law- "Close Connexity" and
the Finance Company as a Holder in Due Course
Basic to the concept of negotiability is the immunity of the
holder in due course' from defenses founded on defects not ap-
parent on the face of the instrument and of which he has no
knowledge.2 In such a case, the holder in due course is not sub-
ject to all the defenses and equities available between the original
parties to the instrument. It is this right of the holder in due
course to rely on the face of the instrument that gives it much of
its commercial usefulness. Maximum negotiability would be
achieved by protecting the holder in due course from all defects
not apparent on the face of the instrument. However, the exi-
gencies of commercial intercourse neither require nor permit
such complete negotiability.
Although problems concerning the status of a party as a
holder in due course are by no means new, with the advent of
post-war prosperity and the marked increase in installment pur-
chasing of consumer goods, the courts have been faced with an
increasing number of situations involving finance companies
which deal in installment paper.
Ordinarily, notes on which finance companies seek to recover
42. See note 39 supra.
43. See Hicks v. Clark, 225 La. 133, 72 So.2d 322 (1954) ; Long Bell Lumber
Co. v. Granger, 222 La. 670, 63 So.2d 420 (1953) ; Liberty Farms v. Miller, 216
La. 1023, 45 So.2d 610 (1950) ; Long Bell Petroleum Co. v. Tritico, 216 La. 426,
43 So.2d 782 (1949). See also Discussion Notes, 4 Oil and Gas Reporter 1528-
29 (1955).
1. See, generally, BRITTON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BILLS AND NOTES 853
et seq. (1943).
2. Id. at 407, § 100 et seq.
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issue from a three-party transaction in which the vendee in a
credit sale executes a promissory note to the vendor. 8 The vendor
endorses the note and transfers it to the finance company. Upon
default of the vendee, the finance company sues on the note and
is met with some defense which the vendee has against the
vendor. Under the Negotiable Instruments Law,4 this defense
may notbe asserted against the finance company if the latter is
a holder in due course. It has been suggested that some finance
companies that work in "close connection" with dealers attempt
to establish a holder in due course status for themselves as a
shield to protect the dealer-finance company "partnership" from
defenses that could normally be asserted by the purchaser.
Therefore, the question arises as to when a finance company in
such situations should be afforded the protection given a holder
in due course. The courts are faced with the problem of either
adhering to the strict limitations of the NIL and thereby preclud-
ing the successful assertion of the defense, or, on the other hand,
protecting the innocent consumer who defaulted on his obliga-
tion because of some fault on the part of the vendor. The pur-
pose of this Comment is to discuss the manner in which this
problem has been treated by the courts. Emphasis will be placed
on Louisiana law, but in order to treat the subject adequately,
some historical background of pertinent sections of the NIL, as
well as cases from other jurisdictions, will be considered.
Background and Development
Section 52 of the NIL in part defines a holder in due course
as a holder who took an instrument under the following condi-
tions:
"(3) That he took it in good faith and for value;
"(4) That at the time it was negotiated to him he had no
notice of any infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title
of the person negotiating it."
Section 56 defines "notice" as used in Section 52 (4) thus:
"To constitute notice of an infirmity in the instrument or
defect in the title of the person negotiating the same, the per-
3. See Adelson, The Mechanics of the Installment Credit Sale, 2 LAW &
CoNTEMP. PROB. 218 (1935) ; Myerson, Practical Aspects of Some Legal Problems
of Sales Finance Companies, 2 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 244 (1935).
4. The Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, hereinafter referred to as the




son to whom it is negotiated must have had actual knowledge
of such facts that his action in taking the instrument amount-
ed to bad faith." (Emphasis added.)
It appears that the draftsmen of the NIL intended to codify
in these sections a subjective test of good faith similar to that
announced in the early English case of Goodman v. Harvey.5
Under this test, if the holder had no actual knowledge of the
equity existing between the original parties at the time of the
purchase, he would not be answerable for any of the equities.
Also, notice is apparently the converse of good faith, as the term
"notice" is defined as actual knowledge amounting to bad faith.
It would seem to follow then, that a subjective test should also
be used in determining if there is notice. Thus the question pre-
sented to the courts is the nature of the test to be applied, that is,
whether to insist on a showing of actual knowledge or to view as
sufficient a finding that the purchaser should have known of the
defect.
Judicial Interpretation
A study of the jurisprudence reveals that the courts are in
conflict in resolving the question of what constitutes notice as
defined in the NIL. In fact, cases indicate that the courts are in
the same dilemma that prevailed before the adoption of the NIL.
Certain "well-settled" rules have developed which deny an ob-
5. 4 Ad. & E. 870, 111 Eng. Rep. 1011 (1836). In Miller v. Race, 1 Burr. 452,
97 Eng. Rep. 398 (1758), Lord Mansfield was of the opinion that unless the pur-
chaser of an instrument is in bad faith, or actually knows that the instrument was
stolen, he can collect on the paper. This position was affirmed in Lawson v.
Weston, 4 Esp. 56, 170 Eng. Rep. 640 (1801), where Lord Kenyon held that there
is no duty to inquire into facts surrounding the original transfer of the paper. The
fact that the instrument has been stolen is relevant only if the purchaser knew
of the theft when he purchased the paper. Shortly thereafter, this good faith-
actual knowledge rule was disregarded in Gill v. Cubit, 3 B. & C. 466, 107 Eng.
Rep. 806 (1824), where the English court announced that there is a duty on the
purchaser to investigate suspicious circumstances, and that it is for the jury to
determine if he had been prudent in the purchase of the instrument. This "sus-
picious circumstance" rule was short-lived, for in Crook v. Jadis, 5 B. & Ad. 909,
110 Eng. Rep. 1028 (1834), the court held that want of due care on the part
of the purchaser is insufficient to justify the letting in of equities existing be-
tween the original parties to the instrument. The next step was for the English
courts to repudiate completely the rule of Gill v. Cubit, and in the leading ease
of Goodman v. Harvey, 4 Ad. & E. 870, 111 Eng. Rep. 1011 (1836), it was held
that gross negligence is not enough; gross negligence is evidence of bad faith, but
is not the same thing. This good faith rule was adopted by the United States
Supreme Court only a few years later in Goodman v. Simonds, 61 U.S. (20 flow.)
343 (1857), but did not have the effect of establishing a uniform rule on the ques-
tion of when equities existing between the original parties can be asserted against
a holder of the instrument.
6. Beutel, Problems of Interpretation Under the Negotiable Instruments Law,
27 NEB. L. REv. 485 (1948).
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jective finding of notice in what would seem to be strong fact
situations. 7 Knowledge that a conditional sales contract was
executed simultaneously with a note does not charge the third
party transferee with notice of equities existing between the
original parties to the note, unless such knowledge could be ob-
tained from the face of the instrument.8 Likewise, knowledge
that the contract is executory does not prevent the endorsee from
being a holder in due course.9 The presence of suspicious circum-
stances is also not a bar to the endorsee's being a holder in due
course.' 0
On the other hand, the statement is often made that the fi-
nance company "was so closely connected with the entire trans-
action that it cannot be heard to say that it, in good faith, was
an innocent purchaser."'" (Emphasis added.) In such cases, the
courts have justified the finding of notice by the use of an ob-
jective test based on this "close connexity" between the holder
and the vendor. Such a finding may rest upon proof of one or
more of the following facts: the proximity of the offices of the
payee and the endorsee, 12 the length of time they have been ac-
quainted,18 the supplying of blank forms to the vendor with the
name of the finance company printed on the reverse side,'4 the
making of payments at the office of the finance company, 5 the
finance company's procuring insurance on the goods for the sale
of which the note was given, 6 the endorsee's approval of the
credit sale through its credit department,17 or the endorsee's
knowledge of prior transactions involving dubious business
ethics of the vendor. 18 It is apparent that where "actual knowl-
7. See notes 8, 9, and 10 inIra.
8. United States v. Novsam Realty Corp., 125 F.2d 456 (2d Cir. 1942) ; BAC
Corp. v. Cirucci, 131 N.J.L. 93, 35 A.2d 36 (1944).
9. Thai v. Credit Alliance Corp., 78 F.2d 212 (D.C. Cir. 1935) ; Cotton v.
John Dure Plane Co., 246 Ala. 36, 18 So.2d 727 (1944) ; Reliance Equipment Co.
v. Sherman, 216 Ala. 214, 112 So. 822 (1927) ; Allenberg v. Rapken and Co., 108
Cal. App. 99, 291 Pac. 281 (1930) ; Davis v. McCready, 17 N.Y. 230, 72 Am. Dec.
461 (1858) ; Metropolitan National Bank v. Vanderpool, 192 S.W. 589 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1917).
10. Davis v. Pennsylvania Co., 337 Pa. 456, 12 A.2d 66 (1940).
11. Commercial Credit Co. v. Childs, 199 Ark. 1073, 1077, 137 S.W.2d 260,
262 (1940).
12. Clark v. Roberts, 206 Mass. 235, 92 N.E. 461 (1910).
13. Ibid. Contra, Stellwagen v. Schmidt, 234 Ill. App. 325 (1924).
14. Commercial Credit Corp. v. Orange County Machine Works, 34 Cal.2d 766,
214 P.2d 819 (1950) ; Mutual Finance Co. v. Martin, 63 So.2d 649 (Fla. 1953).
Contra, Mayer v. American Finance Corp., 172 Okla. 419, 45 P.2d 497 (1935).
15. Mutual Finance Co. v. Martin, 63 So.2d 649 (Fla. 1953).
16. Taylor v. Atlas Sec. Co., 213 Mo. App. 282, 249 S.W. 746 (1923).
17. Buffalo Ind. Bank v. DeMargio, 162 Misc. 742, 296 N.Y. Supp. 783 (City
Ct. 1937), reversed on other grounds, 6 N.Y.S.2d 568 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
18. Davis v. Commercial Credit Corp., 87 Ohio App. 311, 94 N.E.2d 710
19581
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edge" is found to exist from a showing that one or more of the
above facts was present, the courts are employing an objective
test not contemplated by the NIL. The finance company is held
to have had notice because it should have known of the defect. In
so doing, the courts seem to have followed at least three diverse
routes in their finding of "close connexity": (a) by application
of rules of agency; (b) by fictitious establishment of the finance
company as a party to the instrument; (c) by recognition of cer-
tain policy considerations.
Agency. The party usually acquiring subjective actual
knowledge of the infirmity in the instrument or defect in the
thing sold is the payee-vendor. A means of imputing this knowl-
edge to the endorsee-finance company is to find that the vendor
is the agent of the finance company. In this manner the rules of
agency permit the imputation of the agent's knowledge to the
principal. 9 The converse agency situation may also exist. For
example, in Palmer v. Associate Discount Corp.20 the court found
that the finance company was the agent of the vendor. In the
Palmer case the name of the finance company appeared on the
face of the forms in large type and the vendor specifically as-
sumed the obligation of repurchasing the car in case of default
in payment by the vendee. From these facts the court found that
the finance company was the dealer's agent for the purpose of
collecting the notes. 21 Knowledge of the principal was not im-
puted to the agent, but rather the finance company was not per-
mitted to act as agent for collection on the notes in one instance
and act as a holder in due course of the same notes in the next
instance. The typical agency situation exists when the manufac-
(1950). Contra, Standard Acceptance Corp. v. Chapin, 277 Mass. 278, 178 N.E.
538 (1931).
19. In Merchants National Bank v. Marden, Orth and Hastings Co., 234 Mass.
161, 125 N.E. 384 (1919) and Ladd v. Read, 114 Kan. 175, 217 Pac. 273 (1923),
banks were chargeable with knowledge of fraud, as the agents of the banks, the
officers, instigated the transaction. See also Titone v. General Elec. Credit Corp.,
201 Misc. 1041, 108 N.Y.S.2d 909 (Sup. Ct. 1951) ; Public National Bank & Trust
Co. v. Fernandez, 121 N.Y.S.2d 721 (1952) (agency language was used). Of.
Mayer v. American Finance Corp., 172 Okla. 419, 45 P.2d 497 (1935) (no con-
tract between the finance company and the purchaser for a loan of money either
directly or by an agent) ; Security Finance Co. v. Schoenig, 292 S.W. 556 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1922) (no agency) ; Implement Credit Corp. v. Elsinger, 268 Wis. 143,
66 N.W.2d 657 (1954) (supplying of forms was not sufficient evidence to establish
agency).
20. 124 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
21. In United States v. Schaeffer, 33 F. Supp. 547 (D. Md. 1940), the finance
company, which was alleged to be a holder in due course, was charged with knowl-
edge acquired by a contractor and a material company since they were acting for




turer finances the sale of goods by one of its dealers, that is,
when the note given by the vendee is endorsed by the vendor to
the manufacturer. 22
Party to the transaction. Another means of fictitiously
transferring the knowledge of the payee-vendor to the endorsee-
finance company is to find that the finance company, because of
its knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the transaction,
is actually a party to the instrument, and thus charged with
knowledge of infirmities or defects. In the leading case of Com-
mercial Credit Co. v. Childs,28 the blank note, which contained on
the reverse side a printed assignment to the finance company,
was supplied to the vendor by the finance company. The latter
took the assignment of the note on the same day that the instru-
ment was executed by the maker-vendee. Because of this close
connection with the transaction, the finance company was held
to be an original party to the instrument and not a holder.
24
Since it is necessary that a person be a holder before he can claim
the presumption that he is a holder in due course, the court al-
lowed the defense to be asserted against the finance company. 25
Another way to hold that the finance company is a party to the
instrument is to find that financing of the credit sale is actually
a part of the business of selling. Once classified as a "part of
the business," the next step is to say that the finance company
is a party to the sale. 26 Thus, in Buffalo Industrial Bank v. De-
22. Bastian-Blessing Co. v. Stroope, 203 Ark. 116, 155 S.W.2d 892 (1941).
23. 199 Ark. 1073, 137 S.W.2d 260 (1940).
24. The Arkansas court went even further and said that because of the close
connection with the transaction the finance company "had a duty to inquire into
the bona fides of the original sale." This position taken by the Arkansas court
seems contrary to the settled principle that knowledge of suspicious circumstances
does not impose a duty to investigate. However, it could be argued that actual
knowledge is required unless the suspicious circumstances are so strong that to
remain passive would amount to bad faith. Sasner v. Ornsten, 93 Cal.2d 467, 209
P.2d 44 (1949) ; Christian v. California Bank, 93 Cal.2d 230, 208 P.2d 784 (1949).
This argument is weakened by the fact that some courts held that a close business
relationship between the payee and the endorsee does not as a matter of law
deny the endorsee the status of a holder in due course. See Stellwagen v. Schmidt,
234 Ill. App. 325 (1924) (personal relationship is not ordinarily sufficient of itself
to establish notice of bad faith) ; Wilson v. Gorden, 91 A.2d 329 (D.C. Mun. App.
1952).
25. See BuiTToN, BILLS AND NoTEs § 102 (1943), and authorities cited therein.
26. But see Implement Credit Corp. v. Elsinger, 268 Wis. 143, 66 N.W.2d 657
(1954), rehearing denied, 67 N.W.2d 873 (1955). A finance company was founded
by dealers for the express purpose of providing financing services solely to mem-
bers of a dealer association of which some of them were members. The finance
company, which had purchased notes from a particular dealer over a four-year
period, supplied blank forms containing a printed assignment, furnished financial
statement forms, and purchased the notes immediately upon the completion of the
transaction. In rejecting the contention that the finance company was an original
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marzio2 7 a New York court found a bank to be part of the busi-
ness of selling, even though the vendor and the bank were dis-
tinctly separate business enterprises. The decisive factor which
led the court to hold that the bank was a part of the business of
selling was that the conditional sales contract had been sub-
mitted to the credit department of the bank and the vendee's
credit had been approved by that department before any sale was
consummated. The court said that this situation was similar to
the case in which the credit of the vendee was approved by a
credit department of the vendor, the only difference being that
the vendor was now utilizing the facilities and services of a
credit department owned and operated by someone else.
Policy considerations. The majority of cases denying finance
companies the status of a holder in due course do not adopt either
the "agency" or "party to the transaction" rationalizations. In-
stead, actual knowledge is inferred from the close relationship
of payee and endorsee.2 8
By finding notice from a showing of circumstances which
constitute "close connection," it is obvious that justice is not
being done to Section 56 of the NIL, which implies that a sub-
jective test is to be used. Even though it could be shown that
every one of the circumstances which constitute "close connec-
tion" existed in a single case, this is not proof that there was
actual knowledge of an infirmity in the instrument or a defect in
the title of the person negotiating it. All that has been shown
in such a case is that there was actual knowledge of the existence
of a business transaction, and as has been indicated before, this
is not sufficient under the NIL to charge the holder with notice
of defenses which may arise from this transaction. 9 It is sub-
party to the transaction, the Wisconsin court expressly refused to follow the Child8
case.
27. 162 Misc. 742, 296 N.Y. Supp. 783 (City Ct. 1937), reversed on other
grounds, 6 N.Y.S.2d 568 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
28. In Mutual Finance Co. v. Martin, 63 So.2d 649 (Fla. 1953), the Florida
court felt constrained to rely on the provisions of the NIL defining a holder in
due course, and held that actual knowledge existed because of the close connec-
tion. The court indicated that the finance company would not be heard to deny
that it did not have notice-a sort of estoppel theory. See also Schuck v. Mur-
dock Acceptance Corp., 220 Ark. 56, 247 S.W.2d 1 (1952); International Har-
vester Co. v. Watkins, 127 Kan. 50, 272 Pac. 139 (1927) ; Taylor v. Atlas Se-
curity Co., 213 Mo. App. 282, 249 S.W. 746 (1923) (inference of actual knowl-
edge). Contra, Wilson v. Gorden, 91 A.2d 329 (D.C. Mun. App. 1952), where it
was held that a close business association between the purchaser and the payee
of a negotiable instrument does not, as a matter of law, deny to the purchaser the
status of a holder in due course.
29. International Finance Co. v. Magilansky, 105 Pa. Sup. 309, 161 Atl. 613,
614 (1932): "Granting . .. that the indorsee of the note knew that the payee
[Vol. X VIII
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mitted that this refusal to comply with the mandate of Section
56 of the NIL is based on policy considerations which demand
that the "innocent" vendee be protected. The finance company
is in a better position to know the financial standing of the
vendor, as it is in the business of providing credit and purchas-
ing paper. Similarly, since the note purchasing is usually done
in accordance with some prior arrangement, the finance com-
pany is in a better position to know how the vendor operates his
business, the vendor's reputation as a dealer, and the quality of
the goods sold or services performed. Also, if the vendee is per-
mitted to assert his defense in the action on the instrument, time
and expense are conserved, as the finance company will be al-
lowed to call the vendor into the proceedings under the modern
rules of procedure. The entire contest can be settled in one pro-
ceeding where all interested parties are present.80
Regardless of the validity of these policy considerations, it is
difficult to understand how the courts can "legislate" in the face
of Sections 52 and 56 of the NIL requiring actual knowledge of
defects or infirmities.
Louisiana Jurisprudence
The adoption of the NIL in Louisiana in 1904 does not appear
to have provided a solution to the problem of when defenses to
an action on a note may be asserted against an endorsee-finance
company. It will be recalled that Section 52,11 in defining a
holder in due course, declares that he is one who took the note
when it was complete and regular on its face, and without notice
of infirmities or defects in title that existed between the original
parties to the instrument. However, as to the requirement that
there be no notice in order to maintain the position of a holder
in due course, the courts, in some situations, have apparently
departed from the NIL definition of notice as being actual
knowledge of such defects or infirmities. Also, recent cases indi-
cate that the court has read into the requirement that the instru-
was in the business of installing furnaces, and that it took notes of the same
character as the one in suit in its various transactions, this knowledge did not
charge him with notice of the infirmity of this particular note."
30. In Implement Credit Corp. v. Elsinger, 268 Wis. 143, 66 N.W.2d 617
(1954), it was pointed out that the "close connection" is an essential in the busi-
ness of financing and that for the finance company to purchase instruments
executed on forms with which it is not familiar necessitates either the delay of
an investigation or the taking of considerable risk by the finance company, either
of which could seriously impair this method of financing.
31. NIL §52; LA. R.S. 7:52 (1950).
1958]
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ment be complete and regular on its face, a requirement that the
transaction from which the note arose also be complete in order
that the finance company be a holder in due course.
Notice and good faith. It appears to be well settled that
"actual knowledge" of any defect or infirmity will satisfy the
requirement of notice.8 2 In spite of the fact that the practice is
much criticized, in determining whether the finance company
has "actual knowledge" of defects or infirmities, the cases indi-
cate three possible areas of inquiry: the nature of the defense
being asserted by the vendee to the payment of the note, the
extent of the participation by the finance company in the trans-
action out of which the note arises and the legal relations exist-
ing between the parties to the transaction.
Nature of defense. Theoretically, the nature of the defense
should be-of no concern in determining if such actual knowledge
exists. However, as a matter of proof of the existence of actual
knowledge, some conclusions may be drawn from the type of
defense asserted. If the defense asserted is that of lack or fail-
ure of consideration, it is naturally more difficult to prove that
the finance company had actual knowledge of the infirmity,
since in order to be precluded in the successful assertion of the
defense, the finance company must have acquired knowledge of
such defect before the instrument was transferred to it.S3 The
32. LA. R.S. 7:56 (1950) ; Tyler v. Whitney-Central Trust and Savings Bank,
157 La. 249, 102 So. 325 (1924) ; Sandifer v. Stephens, 8 La. App. 546 (1928).
Only the question of "notice" is treated in this paper, but two other reasons for
denying a finance company the status of a holder in due course have recently
caused much litigation: Incompleteness of the instrument and incompleteness of
the transaction. Section 52 of the NIL provides that the instrument must be
complete and regular on its face in order for the holder to be a holder in due
course. In Commercial Credit Corp. v. Freiter, 42 So.2d 296 (La. App. 1949),
no amount was stated on the notes, and the court held that Section 52 had not
been complied with. In dictum in General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Daigle,
225 La. 123, 72 So.2d 319 (1954), the court cited Section 52 and said that the
transaction must also be complete before there can be a holder in dVe course.
See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1954-1955 Term - NEGO-
TIABLE INSTRUMENTS, 15 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 344, 346 (1955). In Allied
Building Credits, Inc. v. Pierce, *79 So.2d 403 (La. App. 1955), the court of ap-
peal relied on this language in the Daigle case and held that the transaction not
eing complete, the 'ote never came into existence. The note lacked a date.
Again, in General Contract Corp. v. Wyington, 81 So.2d 148 (La. App. 1955),
appears the following language: "Under the section above quoted [Section 52 of
the NIL], a purchaser of a negotiable instrument is not a holder in due course
until the transaction is complete." (Emphasis added.) This appears to be erroneous
because a failure or lack of consideration is a defense to an instrument, and should
have nothing to do with the question of who is a holder in due course. If the note
is incomplete, then clearly Section 52 dictates that any person taking the incom-
plete note is not a fiolder in due course.
33. Standard Motor Finance Co. v. Yellow Bayou Gin and Planting Co., 1 La.
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knowledge must also be of some present defect in the considera-
tion and not just a suspicion that there will be a failure of con-
sideration in the future.84 Mere knowledge of what the consid-
eration was will not constitute knowledge of the fact that the
consideration has failed. 5 For example, in Martel v. Lafayette
Sugar Refining Co.,86 the endorsee had knowledge of an express
warranty made by the vendor, but did not have knowledge that
there had been a breach of this warranty. The court rejected the
contention that the endorsee should be held to have had knowl-
edge of this breach. On the other hand, if the defense asserted
by the vendee is that there is some defect which is apparent on
the face of the instrument negotiated to the finance company, as
opposed to a lack or failure of consideration, the finance com-
pany is presumed to have actual knowledge of this defect, and
thus cannot be a holder in due course.8 7 For example, if usurious
interest is charged, it can be observed from the face of the note
that there is a defect in the instrument.88 Likewise, if it appears
on the face of the instrument that the vendor agrees to purchase.
insurance on the goods which are later destroyed by fire, and
such insurance was not procured, the finance company taking the
note is held to have actual knowledge of the fact that there was
such an obligation to obtain insurance.8 9
This distinction drawn between the case in which the defect
is apparent on the face of the note and that in which it is not
App. 424 (1925). The vice or defect in the thing sold was not discovered until
sometime after the sale.
34. Sadler v. White, 14 La. Ann. 177 (1859) ; Martel v. Lafayette Sugar Re-
fining Co., 153 La. 248, 95 So. 706 (1923). Endorsee had knowledge of an express
warranty made by the vendor, but had no knowledge that there had been a breach
of this warranty.
35. Bank of Eudora v. Crowe, 2 La. App. 669 (1925). In Tyler v. Whitney-
Central Trust & Savings Bank, 157 La. 249, 102 So. 325 (1924), the notes in con-
troversy recited that their value is "to be received in rent."
36. Martel v. Lafayette Sugar Refining Co., 153 La. 248, 95 So. 706 (1923).
37. Distinction recognized in Commercial Credit Corp. v. Freiter, 42 So.2d
296 (La."App. 1949) (dictum), 24 TuL. L. REV. 485 (1950). See also White
System v. Hall, 219 La. 440, 53 So.2d 227 (1951), 27 TUL. L. REV. 255 (1953).
38. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Swain, 176 So. 636 (La. App. 1937),
cited with approval in CIT Corp. v. Emmons, 197 So. 662 (La. 1940).
39. CIT Corp. v. Emmons, 197 So. 662 (La. App. 1940). The court said that
the finance company had full knowledge of the vendor's contracting to purchase
insurance, thus there was actual knowledge of the infirmity -failure of con-
sideration. This was so, the court indicated, because the finance company "stoo d
in the shoes" of the vendor so far as this obligation to purchase insurance was
concerned. This writer submits that, conceding that the finance company had
knowledge of the obligation to purchase insurance, there was no knowledge that
there had been a breach of this obligation. Compare Bank of Eudora v. Crowe,
2 La. App. 669 (1925), where the court held that knowledge of what the con-




apparent from examination of the instrument is both reasonable
in nature and supported by the NIL. The imposition of a duty to
investigate the contents of an instrument is not the imposition
of any duty to investigate "suspicious circumstances," a duty
supposedly abolished by Sections 52 and 56. It is only an as-
sumption by the court of what common sense dictates, that is,
that anyone paying for an instrument reads or should read it be-
fore he purchases. However, the endorsee-finance company
cannot be presumed to know by a mere reading of the instru-
ment that the consideration has failed.
Active participation in transaction. In some situations a
showing of actual knowledge of the defect or infirmity is not
made, but because of its active participation in the transaction,
the finance company will not be heard to say that it did not have
such knowledge. This estoppel principle is applied either when
the finance company had knowledge of circumstances surround-
ing the execution of the instrument or when the finance com-
pany, through past business experience, has acquired certain
knowledge concerning the parties to the instrument in question
or the merchandise being sold.40 In the first situation,41 it would
seem that the only knowledge inferred would be that acquired
by the endorsee from reading the instrument or from participat-
ing in the transaction. To hold otherwise would be to impose a
duty upon the endorsee to investigate where there are suspicious
circumstances arising during the transaction. However, in Citi-
zens Loan Corp. v. Robbins,42 in which the note was drafted in
the presence of the vendor, vendee, and agent of the finance
company, and the act of sale was prepared by the finance com-
40. But see Citizens Loan Corp. v. Robbins, 40 So.2d 503 (La. App. 1949),
where the note had been drawn up in the presence of the vendor, vendee, and
employee of the finance company. The court held that, since the finance company
"actively directed" the transaction between the vendor and the purchaser, the
finance company had knowledge of defects in the thing sold. The Robbins case
seems questionable because of the fact that the defects in the automobile were
not discovered until after the finance company took the note. Also, under the
established jurisprudence, the finance company should have been presumed to have
knowledge of those defects that are apparent from the face of the instrument. In
the Robbins case, the court of appeal inferred knowledge of failure of considera-
tion from the fact that the finance company had drawn up the instruments for
the parties. See White System v. Hall, 219 La. 440, 53 So.2d 227 (1951), where
Justice Hawthorne questioned the Robbins decision, and said that the case would
have been decided differently had it been before the Supreme Court. But see also
General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Daigle, 225 La. 123, 72 So.2d 319 (1954),
where Justice Moise cited the Robbins case with approval.
41. Pralon v. Aymond, 12 Rob. 486 (La. 1846). The same language was used
after the adoption of the NIL in General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Swain, 176
So. 636 (1937) (dictum).
42. 40 So.2d 503 (La. App. 1949).
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pany, the court of appeal inferred that the finance company had
actual knowledge of a defect in the automobile purchased. In
effect, the court said that knowledge of a failure of considera-
tion can be inferred when the "plaintiff was so directly inter-
ested and involved in the transaction of purchase that he can-
not escape the legal imputation that he stands in the shoes of the
vendor." On the other hand, the Louisiana Supreme Court has
held that the NIL does not permit such an inference to be drawn
since this would be imposing a duty to investigate suspicious cir-
cumstances.48 In the second situation, in which knowledge of
defects or infirmities is inferred from apprisal of facts acquired
through past experience, the court is, in effect, requiring the fi-
nance company to be "prudent," something not contemplated by
the NIL. Thus, when a company subsequently financed the sale
of an automobile which it had financed for another purchaser on
a prior occasion, it was charged with knowledge of defects in the
automobile and the title thereto.44 The court reasoned that a
prudent finance company would have checked to ascertain
whether any previous sale of the same car had been handled by
it. In a somewhat analogous situation, it has been held that an
inference of actual knowledge of defects could not be drawn from
the fact that the finance company had previously sued on notes
negotiated to it by the same vendor.45 The position taken here
appears sound under the NIL, as no duty is being imposed on a
holder to investigate all of the circumstances surrounding the
creation and transfer of the paper.
Legal relations between the parties. Louisiana courts, like
courts in some other jurisdictions, have relied on agency prin-
ciples to find that the finance company had actual knowledge of
defects or infirmities. However, in Louisiana such knowledge
possessed by the agent will be imputed to the principal only
where the agency is established for the purpose of selling mer-
chandise. In International Harvester v. Carruth46 a "business
agency" was found to exist when the manufacturer financed
sales made by one of its dealers. In such a situation, knowledge
of a defect in the thing sold is imputed to the manufacturer, as
his agent is presumed to have possessed such knowledge by vir-
tue of the fact that he was a vendor. However, if it is found that
43. White System v. Hall, 219 La. 440, 53 So.2d 227 (1951).
44. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Daigle, 225 La. 123, 72 So.2d 319
(1954).
45. Stevens v. Brown, 9 La. App. 463, 121 So. 305 (1928).
46. 23 So.2d 473 (La. App. 1945).
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a vendor is an agent of the finance company solely for the pur-
pose of securing a loan for one of the vendor's customers, knowl-
edge of defects in the thing sold will not be imputed to the fi-
nance company, as the latter is engaged in the transaction only
for the purpose of lending money.47 The only knowledge imputed
in such a case is that acquired by the agent while acting within
the scope of his authority, that is, while he is negotiating a loan.
Knowledge acquired while the agent is acting outside the scope
of his authority, that is, while he is selling merchandise, is not
imputed to the finance company.48
Conclusion
In conclusion, although the Louisiana cases concerning the
status of finance companies as holders in due course refer to a
"close connection" or "active participation" by the finance com-
pany, most of the decisions rest upon some ground other than
actual knowledge inferred from the fact of closeness of partici-
pation. This is as it should be, since to hold otherwise would be
to defeat the purpose of the NIL and its function in facilitating
the flow of commercial paper. While it is true that the innocent
purchaser is justified in complaining when a finance company
has in fact been guilty of using the NIL as a "shield," most of
these cases can be solved within the framework of the NIL. Ex-
tension of protection to the consumer at the expense of nego-
tiability and the extension of consumer credit financing are mat-
ters of public policy which should be resolved by the Legislature.
In fact, the Louisiana Supreme Court has recognized that any
retreat from the requirement of actual knowledge by the NIL
must be made by the Legislature and not by the court.49
Richard F. Knight
47. Standard Motors Finance Co. v. Yellow Bayou Gin and Planting Co., 1 La.
App. 424 (1925).
48. Ibid.
49. White System v. Hall, 219 La. 440, 53 So.2d 227 (1951).
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